

# / Avnet Silica – Security Services

Secure provisioning capabilities

AVNET<sup>®</sup> SILICA



# Main stake of IoT Security

**IoT Security** implies the use of good practices in term of **products, developments** but it implies also to **reduce opened doors, and provisioning** is one of them.



## NEEDS

- Certification Authority
- Sub-CA per projects
- Unique ID
- Unique keys



## CHIP MANUFACTURER S

- Provide generic CA
- Very High volumes for customization



## EMS SERVICES

- Not equipped with HSM
- Lack of secure channel to communicate
- Difficulty to define TCO




## SECURITY CONCERNS

- Security mechanism
- Authentication mechanism
- Integrity mechanism
- All manipulated by EMS

# Secure provisioning by Avnet Silica


On top of MCU, Memory, MPU and Secure elements Avnet Silica is providing Secure provisioning services. It consists of





# Use cases

# Secure Provisioning General Principle



# / 1 – Provisioning for IoT Cloud Platforms



They all required the same kind of process:

## Device

- Certificate creations or loaded
- Keys generation
- Public key injection
- Private key

## Cloud

- White List
- Credentials provisioning
- Identity provisioning
- Certification authority

## Methods:

- X.509 certificates
  - o Public/Private keys
  - o Certificate in both sides
- Symmetric keys
  - o Same keys on both sides

# / 2 – Provisioning for specific Standard/Consortium

They required a specific PKI based authentication

- OEM is using secure channel to load its credentials into Secure programming machines
- Avnet Silica inject X.509 certificates into the device and associated keys
- Certificate must be loaded on both side, device and cloud and will be used in TLS connection for client authentication
- Avnet Silica inject Public key of Trusted CA (Standard/Consortium), so that devices can authenticate their peers



# / 3 – Provisioning for IP Protection

Some OEMs want to protect their IP from theft at manufacturing...


- Avnet Silica provisioning capabilities can offer several options
- Program the components with the final **Firmware** and lock the components with readout protection. (Implies the FW is available when shipping components )
- Program the components with a **Secure Boot Loader**. Implies injecting a secret key for firmware encryption in the bootloader. Implies encrypting the firmware before sending it to the EMS. Implies injecting a secret key for firmware encryption in the bootloader



# / 4 – Provisioning for Secure Boot / Secure FOTA

FOTA is very convenient if not mandatory...And it **MUST** be done in a secure way

- FOTA payload must be protected during transport
- FOTA payload must be authenticated, and integrity protected
- **This can be achieved by asymmetric crypto:** Private key is kept by developer of the FW (RSA or ECDSA), FW signed with this key, matching public key must be loaded into each device to verify signature
- **Or by symmetric crypto** a secret key kept by developers. FW signed with this key (CMAC or HMAC). This secret key has to be programmed into each device.



The image features a solid green background. Two thin white diagonal lines are present: one in the top-left corner and one in the bottom-right corner, both extending towards the center. The text "Thank You" is centered in a large, black, sans-serif font.

Thank You